How does political ambition affect carbon emission intensity in China?

Abstract

We try to expand the political promotion tournaments in Chinese local governments from raising GDP to the level of increasing fiscal revenues. From the vantage point of officials' performance appraisal, we investigate the impact of local government officials' political ambitions, represented by the ex-ante commitment level of fiscal revenue targets, on carbon emission intensity (CEI). Utilizing a sample of 209 prefecture-level cities in China spanning 2006 to 2019, this paper empirically scrutinizes the influence of local government political ambition on CEI. The findings reveal that the greater the political ambition of local government officials, the more pronounced the reduction in CEI. Furthermore, our study demonstrates that political ambition contributes to the decline of CEI by elevating the levels of environmental attention and green innovation. This research not only aids in comprehending the rationale and necessity of the political promotion tournaments implemented by the Chinese central government but also offers valuable insights for other developing countries seeking to mitigate CEI.