Abstract
We test in the laboratory four mechanisms whereby group identification might affect redistribution in representative democracies. For voters, group identification can give rise to a preference for own-group payoffs, for electing an own-group candidate, and could be used to assess candidate-sincerity. For candidates, identity might affect the optimal campaign platform. There is evidence to support all four. Our key contribution comes from bringing the candidate supply of redistribution policies into an equilibrium analysis with voter demand for redistribution. It yields an important new insight: the extent of minority group political representation among the electoral candidates critically affects redistribution outcomes.
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