Abstract
This article lays out a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of the clarity of alternatives on corruption voting. Traditional approximations to the question of why corrupt politicians win elections focus on the limited availability of information and voter biases toward in-group candidates. I argue that while citizens are ready to punish corruption, the electoral toll for a corrupt candidate is reduced in settings of unclear electoral choices. I find support for this theoretical framework by examining the accountability enhancing consequences of the clarity of alternatives in Latin America. The results indicate that politicians running for office in settings of weak clarity of alternatives sustain less electoral damage than those running in settings of strong clarity of alternatives. The implication is that party decisions that increase voter uncertainty about the menu of choices contribute to the electoral fortune of corrupt politicians.
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