How do Lithuanian Citizens Perceive the European Parliament? EU Legitimacy Issue and Trust in the European Parliament

The present contribution to the scholarly knowledge about European Parliament (EP) elections essentially assembles analyses of the data of the 2004 European Election Study. Due to the very nature of large‐scale cross‐national comparative survey research, it will only be published shortly after the 2009 European Parliament election. As it would certainly be inadequate to ignore the fact that another European election took place just before publication, this introduction to the analyses that follow will start out with a first inspection of the results of this most recent European election—the election of the members of the European Parliament in June 2009. The main question we will be asking is about the persistence of the ‘second‐order’ character of these elections: are the 2009 European Parliament election results in line with our expectations about European Parliament elections as second‐order national elections as laid out originally by Reif and Schmitt (1980) and restated and refined in a large number of subsequent publications? The second part of this introduction will then go on and do what every introduction does: briefly present the contributions that follow.

The contributions collected in this Max Weber Working Papers Special Issue were first delivered at a conference held at the European University Institute and jointly organised by the Max Weber Programme for Postdoctoral Studies and the Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies in March 2015 on ‘Parliaments and parliamentary elections in Europe’. Following the transformations undertaken by the European and national parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon, the 2014 European elections, the unprecedented politicization and the challenges posed to representative democracy by the Eurozone crisis, the Special Issue aims to investigate three intertwined themes. (I) Parliamentary representation: European and national at the same time?; (II) national parliaments in EU policymaking; and (III) dynamics of Euroscepticism and its effects on law-making. In particular the papers deal with the ability of parliaments to democratically represent people in the European Union today and to affect the European integration process, with the asymmetric involvement of national parliaments in the EU, their dynamics of cooperation as well as between them and the European Parliament, and finally, with the implications on EU democratic legitimacy of recent developments regarding parliamentary input provided at a very early stage of the European policymaking. Other issues, such as transposition and the representation of eurosceptics in the European Parliament are also dealt with.

The purpose of the article is to diagnose the causes of the increased interest shown by Poles in the European parliamentary election in 2019. From 2014 to 2019, Poles’ participation in elections to the European Parliament went up from 23.83% to 45.68%. Drawing on Europe salience theory and second-order election theory, I set out to determine whether changes in Poles’ attitudes towards the European Union led to this almost twofold increase in turnout from 2014 to 2019, or whether this trend was mainly attributable to the election cycle, that is, the coincidence in 2019 of both European and domestic parliamentary elections. My research involved an analysis of survey data (CBOS, Eurobarometr), statistical data, and the course of the European parliamentary election campaign. During the analysis, it turned out that in the years 2014–2019 there were no significant changes in how the European Union and its institutions were perceived by Poles that could explain the dramatic increase in interest in the European election. What had the greatest impact on voter behaviour was the fact that the European election was held just several months before an election to the Polish parliament. The Polish political parties treated the European election in May as a test of support in the nation election to be held in the autumn – as a ‘quasi-first round.’ The European election campaign was heavily covered by the media, and focused on domestic issues (building up Poland’s welfare state). The ruling party’s announcement of numerous social reforms and a desire to influence the result of the ‘May round’ mobilised an above-average number of Poles to take an active part in the European election.

After six sets of European Parliament elections, do voters primarily use these elections to punish their national governments or to express their views on European issues? We answer this question by looking at all European elections (1979–2004) in all 25 EU states. We find that almost 40% of the volatility in party vote-shares in European elections compared to national elections is explained by the transfer of votes from large and governing parties to small and opposition parties. Nevertheless, anti-EU parties and green parties on average do better in European elections than in national elections. But these “European effects” are minor, and the position a party takes on Europe is largely irrelevant to its performance. Hence, despite the growing powers of the European Parliament, neither positions on matters regarding European integration, nor on matters regarding “normal” left-right policy, have much of an effect on electoral outcomes.

Today, dubbing European Parliament (EP) elections as 'second-order' is something of a truism, since such a conclusion has already been expressed by numerous authors, with regard to both national-level rivalries and the entire European electoral market.1 EP elections are considered to be of secondary importance by both politicians and citizens: recent research by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), revealed that approximately 60 % of Poles are convinced that European elections are largely insignificant.2 This opinion is reflected in turnout rates, which are consistently lower than in the case of national parliamentary elections. As for political actors, their low regard for EP elections translates into less intense campaigns. Moreover, despite the fact these elections concern a European-level body, parties tend to focus their agendas on national politics.

Populism has been a feature of Latvia’s political landscape since the 1990s. New insurgent parties have utilized increasingly anti-establishment rhetoric, often through intensive and innovative use of social media, to win seats in the Latvian parliament and even join government coalitions. However, European Parliament elections in Latvia have been comparatively free of populism. There are two main reasons for this. First, and most importantly, there is a broad pro-European consensus in Latvia. Membership in the European Union and NATO is central to all three Baltic nations’ security strategy in light of growing threats from Russia. As a result, there is no serious Eurosceptic party in Latvia and no explicitly Eurosceptic politicians have ever been elected to the European Parliament from Latvia. Second, Latvia’s voters tend to support serious, experienced politicians in European elections, believing that they are better placed to support Latvia’s national interests in the European system. Party politics take second place in campaigning, with the focus being on the experience of candidates (after all, Latvia elected just nine MEPs in 2024) rather than policy differences. As a result, populist anti-elite rhetoric has less salience. This chapter will explore the extent to which the 2024 European Parliament election in Latvia has continued these trends. Keywords: Latvia; populism; European Parliament; Russia–Ukraine War; election campaign

Throughout the European Parliament’s nearly forty years of existence, electoral turnout in European parliamentary elections has consistently been lower than electoral turnout in the national elections of the member states. This is particularly the case for the majority of states in Eastern Europe where turnout in European elections has resulted in low electoral participation of eligible voters. Focusing on the 2014 election to the European Parliament, we highlight that low election-specific knowledge contributes to these low participation rates. In more detail, we rely on name recognition of the main candidates of the three main party groups, and show that knowledge of these candidates is more than twice as high in Western Europe as in Eastern Europe. Second, we illustrate that these low knowledge levels in the East also help explain the larger turnout gap between national and European elections in the East.

The resurgence of populist radical right parties in European democracies has been one of the most scrutinized and thoroughly documented political phenomena in the past four decades. So far, the bulk of the existing comparative research on populist radical right parties has been mainly concerned with first-order elections in Western Europe, less so with European elections. European integration and Euroscepticism are crucial features of the populist radical right however. Most parties of the populist radical right take a negative stance towards the European Union, and the European Parliament is also an arena that allows if not encourages cross-national co-operation. This chapter examines populist radical parties in European elections across all Western and Eastern member states, factors of variation in their electoral support and how European elections are linked to the national election cycle. Based upon Mudde's (2007) definition of the populist radical right, this chapter suggests a brief account of the presence of this party family in European parliament since 1979, together with a political mapping of its location in the collaborative space within the European arena. The second section looks more specifically at the status and role of EP elections within the national election cycle, and addresses the issue of regularity and change in the existing inter-relations between European and national first-order elections across EU-member states.

It is now commonplace to criticise the failings of Westminster’s ‘political class’. One part of this criticism regards the limited extent to which Westminster politicians reflect the social background of the voting population. Each party has addressed the problem in different ways, with Labour more likely to focus on the representation of women and the Conservatives on people with ‘proper jobs’ before election.1 Devolved and European elections have provided new opportunities for parties: Labour’s push for more elected women has been relatively effective in the Scottish, Welsh and European elections; and, before UKIP made significant gains in European Parliament elections in 2014, it promised candidates who were ‘not career politicians’. Yet, overall, new levels of elected representation have not produced a distinctive ‘political class’. There is still a common pattern of professionalisation across devolved, Westminster and European parliaments, in which elected politicians have often similar kinds of education and employment background, and generally struggle to mirror the social background of their populations.

Considering the “new” Southern European democracies (Greece, Portugal and Spain), this article has three main objectives. First, the article tests the short‐term and the long‐term impacts of national factors on voting behaviour in European Parliament (EP) elections. Second, the article evaluates the specificity of voting behaviour in EP elections, vis‐à‐vis voting behaviour in first‐order contests, namely, in terms of the extent to which the opportunities for defection in EP elections are in fact used by voters. Last but not least, the article analyses the impact of voting behaviour in EP elections on the anchors of partisanship in new democracies. Due to their second‐order nature, EP elections provide opportunities for defection without major consequences for the (national) political system. However, in new democracies, especially in the first decades of the new regimes, defection can be disturbing for the consolidation of ties between electors and political parties and, consequently, for the stabilization of the party system. By studying the “new” Southern European democracies in their first three decades of democracy (1970s–2004), we may learn lessons about the impact of EP elections upon the stabilization of the anchors of partisanship in new democracies more generally.

In 2024, Bulgarians participated forthe fifth time in electing theirrepresentatives to the European Parliament. Unlike the general trend observed across the EU, which indicates higher voter turnout, Bulgaria has maintained a relatively stable turnout rate across its last three European elections. The role of media content in shaping the public agenda is substantial, as it highlights current and significant topics. While media alone cannot guarantee the impact of the issues they cover, it plays a crucial role in establishing an agenda and framing public interest. Thus, media significantly influences audience perceptions and attitudes towards particular issues or events. This role of the media as gatekeepers of information becomes even more critical during election campaigns. However, it remains questionable whether online media in Bulgaria provides sufficient information to enable citizens to make informed choices about their European Parliament representatives. This paper presents findings from a 2019 study analysing the online media coverage of the 2019 European Parliament election campaign in Bulgaria and compares these findings with a similar study conducted in 2024. The primary hypothesis posits that only a few lessons have been learned from previous European Parliament election campaigns, which impedes citizens’ ability to be adequately informed about EU agenda topics and to elect representatives who will effectively advocate for their rights and interests.

ABSTRACTThe European Parliament promised voters that the 2014 elections would be different. According to its interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty, a vote in these European elections would also be a vote for the President of the Europe's executive, the Commission. To reinforce this link between the European elections and the Commission President, the major political groups each nominated a lead candidate, Spitzenkandidat, for the post. This article examines how this innovation affected the 2014 elections. It concludes that the presidential candidates did not play a major role in the election campaigns, except in a handful of countries, and thus had a limited impact on voter participation and vote choices. However, the European Parliament was very successful in imposing its interpretation of the new modified procedure for electing the Commission President, not shared by all national governments, and this will have important implications for the inter-institutional dynamics in the Union and the future of European democracy.

This article examines an alternative logic for candidate renomination to the European Parliament (EP), based upon the size and ideological nature of a Member of the European Parliament’s (MEP’s) home party, as well as timing of EP elections. I derive expectations from the second-order election hypothesis to show that parties from outside of the national mainstream should expect to benefit disproportionately from EP elections and therefore renominate experienced incumbents at higher rates. Using original data on the career behaviour of MEPs during the 2009 and 2014 elections, I find that such parties are more likely to treat EP contests as ‘first order’ in their importance, particularly when European elections are held during the midterm period of the national election cycle. My findings have new implications for the differentiated volatility of the EP, specifically, as well as for internal party dynamics in multi-level systems, more generally.

Reif and Schmitt argued that elections to the European Parliament should be understood as second-order national elections, and advanced several predictions about the results of such elections. Those concerning the impact of government status, party size, party character and the national election cycle on electoral performance are examined here using data on four sets of European Parliament elections. In addition, the consequences of European Parliament elections for the next national election are explored. The analysis demonstrates the validity of most of Reif and Schmitt's original propositions, and further refines their analysis of the relationship between European and subsequent national elections. However, all propositions hold much more effectively in countries where alternation in government is the norm, suggesting that the distinction between first-order and second-order elections may not be so clear cut as Reif and Schmitt imagined.

European elections take place against the background of the political culture of European integration. “Political culture” in this context means the attitudes, preferences, perceptions, knowledge, and behavioral propensities of the mass of European citizens vis-à-vis the European institutions in particular and European integration in general. In order to investigate the culture of integration in which the European Parliament elections of 1999 took place, this chapter first provides an overview of the development of orientations toward European integration since the early 1970s, including some examination of the limited evidence that exists on the cognitive aspect of these orientations. The chapter then focuses on the situation just prior to the 1999 elections and summarizes the main features of attitudes toward Europe and its institutions as the citizens prepared (or, as we know, in many cases did not prepare) to go to the polls to elect the members of the first European Parliament for the new millennium. This section of the chapter also provides a more detailed examination of two indicators of attitudes to integration, analyzing variations across countries and across the different social and demographic sectors of European society. The third main section of the chapter compares the attitudes and perceptions of citizens as manifested in the 1994 and 1999 European elections.