How do Chinese judges invoke the constitution? Analysis based on 1907 decisions

Abstract

Abstract The abolition of the judicial interpretation issued by the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China in Qi Yuling’s case marks the end of the trend of developing a judicial constitutional review system in China, but issues of courts invoking constitutional norms in judicial decisions continue to arise. This essay investigates the actual situation of the Constitution in judicial decisions by categorizing 1907 court decisions that invoked the Constitution as the reasoning basis and the court decisions which invoked the Constitution as the decision-making basis and by exploring the logic of the use of the Constitution by Chinese judges. In the absence of a constitutional review system, the primary sense of Chinese judges invoking constitutional norms is characterized by “simplistic reasoning”, “politicized enforcement” and the “parent law” concept. The insufficient judgment reason is a universal feature of judicial adjudication in Chinese courts. However, due to the lack of a constitutional review system, the poor perception of the interpretation and application of the constitution may exacerbate the lack of legal arguments invoked by the Constitution. The political model of Constitution enforcement in China makes judges invoke the Constitution in judicial decisions by “asserting the prestige of the Constitution”, which leads to numerous errors in legal argumentation in judicial decisions. This also reflects the tendency of “political enforcement” to take precedence over the legal enforcement of the Constitution. The influence of the old “parent law” concept is that judges can arbitrarily apply constitutional norms directly to civil cases, including fundamental rights norms. By summarizing and describing the above three features, we can depict the activities of current Chinese courts in invoking the Constitution.