How do 28 European Union Member States perform in agricultural greenhouse gas emissions? It depends on what we look at: Application of the multi-criteria analysis

Searching for solutions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by agricultural policy decisions — Application of system dynamics modeling for the case of Latvia

Energy-related GHG emission in agriculture of the European countries: An application of the Generalized Divisia Index

Purpose– The purpose of this study is to assess how the recent financial and economic crisis has affected European Union (EU) member states’ ability to attract intellectual capital. The issue was found to be relevant, as one of the key elements of competitiveness today is the ability to attract intellectual capital and the question how the recent financial and economic crisis has changed this ability of EU member states can be asked. The question is relevant in relation to the diversity of effects that the crisis had on EU member states, including, the different levels of real economy adjustment constraints.Design/methodology/approach– The concept of competitiveness applied by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in constructing the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) was used. Based on selected WEF GCI sub-indicators and the WEF’s methodology, we a new index named “Ability to attract intellectual capital” was generated. EU member states’ performance was compared along this indicator for the 2007-2008 (pre-crisis) and the 2013-2014 (post-crisis) periods. In this way, EU member states can be ranked before and after the crisis; their performance can be compared in the two periods, relatively to each other, and in relation to their performance along other relevant indices.Findings– The findings show interesting results. First, many peripheral EU member states, deeply affected by the crisis, could considerably improve their relative positions between 2007 and 2013. Second, the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries show a rather mixed picture, drawing up rather different individual development paths. Third, the advancements in some countries do not imply that overall convergence is proceeding in the EU. Nevertheless, some countries have not wasted the “good” crisis to take those steps of structural reform.Research limitations/implications– Because we only look at two time periods (pre-and post-crisis), the authors are not able to describe the processes that were going on in the EU member states during the years of the crisis; the results can only show the difference between the two periods. Furthermore, there may be other methodological approaches to countries’ abilities to attract intellectual capital that may bring results different from this study’s results. For the countries who, according to our investigations, could improve these abilities, enhanced competitiveness is likely to occur in a few years’ time.Practical implications– For those countries aiming at improving their abilities to attract intellectual capital, or for EU policy design, this research may provide useful results. Moreover, not only this study’s results but also the methodology can be used by others, for other purposes: to compare different years, different sets of countries included in the WEF GCI or even along different dimensions.Social implications– This study’s research findings, the authors believe, will help EU member states and the EU as a whole in getting to know their abilities to attract intellectual capital better. In the introductory part of this paper, the aim was also to collect arguments from the economic theory to explain why such abilities are crucial for future competitiveness of countries.Originality/value– The methodology that was used is the adoption of WEF methodology, and the data are from the WEF GCI dataset. However, to the authors’s knowledge, no other research work has applied this methodology on this set of WEF GCI sub-indicators, with such purposes as to compare EU member states’ abilities to attract intellectual capital before and after the crisis.

Disharmonization in the Regulation of Transgenic Plants in Europe

Editorial: Governing the EU's climate and energy transition through the 2030 Framework

Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from agriculture contribute to climate change. The consequences of unsustainable agricultural activity are polluted water, soil, air, and food. The agricultural sector has become one of the major contributors to global GHG emissions and is the world’s second largest emitter after the energy sector, which includes emissions from power generation and transport. Latvian and Lithuanian agriculture generates about one fifth of GHG emissions, while Estonia generates only about one tenth of the country’s GHG emissions. This paper investigates the GHG trends in agriculture from 1995 to 2019 and the driving forces of changes in GHG emissions from the agricultural sectors in the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), which are helpful for formulating effective carbon reduction policies and strategies. The impact factors have on GHG emissions was analysed by using the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) method based on Kaya identity. The aim of this study is to assess the dynamics of GHG emissions in agriculture and to identify the factors that have had the greatest impact on emissions. The analysis of the research data showed that in all three Baltic States GHG emissions from agriculture from 1995 to 2001–2002 decreased but later exceeded the level of 1995 (except for Lithuania). The analysis of the research data also revealed that the pollution caused by animal husbandry activities decreased. GHG intensity declined by 2–3% annually, but the structure of agriculture remained relatively stable. The decomposition of GHG emissions in agriculture showed very large temporary changes in the analysed factors and the agriculture of the Baltic States. GHG emissions are mainly increased by pollution due to the growing economy of the sector, and their decrease is mainly influenced by two factors—the decrease in the number of people employed in the agriculture sector and the decreasing intensity of GHGs in agriculture. The dependence of the result on the factors used for the decomposition analysis was investigated by the method of multivariate regression analysis. Regression analysis showed that the highest coefficient of determination (R2 = 0.93) was obtained for Estonian data and the lowest (R2 = 0.54) for Lithuanian data. In the case of Estonia, all factors were statistically significant; in the case of Latvia and Lithuania, one of the factors was statistically insignificant. The identified GHG emission factors allowed us to submit our insights for the reduction of emissions in the agriculture of the Baltic States.

In this paper, I address the issue of European Union (EU) Member States' participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) after the EU Reform Treaty enters into force. In Giuliano Amato's view, no member of the EU is powerful enough to be taken seriously on its own in the international arena. Thus, in order to play an effective role in the world, the EU must join together. In this sense, coordinating its foreign trade policies and streamlining the process was one of Amato's major ambitions during the Convention on the future of Europe. If Amato's ambitions were to materialize, it would therefore be correct to interpret that EU Member States will no longer participate in the WTO forum because the EU Constitutional and Reform Treaties give exclusive competence to the EU in all areas of trade policy. However, how do we reconcile the fact that the EC and its Member States are currently members of the WTO, but after the EU Constitutional Treaty or its successor, the Reform Treaty, the EU will have exclusive competence in all trade matters? Aren't EU Member States sovereign states? Once the EU Reform Treaty is in force, how will the current polycephalous physiognomy of the EU in the WTO change? Will it make a difference? Will the EU become monocephalous in international trade negotiations, i.e., a sole trade actor? What will its implications be? Will EU Member States disappear from international trade fora? Is the EU becoming a federation of States when it comes to trade policy?

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze a particular aspect of the so-called Dublin Regulation, whose aim is to determine the European Union (EU) Member State responsible for examining an asylum application, that is, the presumption that the EU Member States are “safe countries.” Although the notion of “safe country” is on the base of the Dublin Regulation functioning mechanism, as it implies that any EU Member States can transfer an asylum seeker to any other EU country which is responsible, the authors contend that the safety of an EU Member State can be given as presumed for the purpose of asylum seekers. The analysis of the present work starts, firstly, with the examination of the notion of “safe country” under the Dublin Regulation. In the second part, relying on the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) case-law, it will be discussed to what extent the Court of Strasbourg clarifies the notion of “safe countries” and the test it applies to it. Finally, the Commission’s proposal for a recasting of the Dublin Regulation will be analysed with the aim of foresee possible future developments of the EU law mechanisms to rebut such a presumption as applied to the EU Member States. It will emerge that in order to assess the safety of an EU Member State, attention has to be given to the prohibition of both direct and indirect refoulement as well as to the effective remedy at the EU Member State’s domestic level.

Globally, annual emissions from managed organic soils accounts for up to 5% of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Climate-wise management and restoration of degraded organic soils could reduce GHG emissions quickly and at relatively low costs. The European Union (EU) Member States that have large areas of organic soils with high GHG emissions are Sweden, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Netherlands, and the Baltic countries. To meet the climate targets and objectives of the Paris Agreement the land-use sector is indispensable and mitigation policies targeting organic soils will be needed. The international regulatory framework is broad and quite unspecific. In contrast, the European Union has initiated binding regulation for the land-use sector through the EU Climate Law, the EU LULUCF regulation, and the proposed EU Nature Restoration Law. However, even this regulatory approach is not on track to deliver on its binding ambitions, indicating the need for more effective implementation measures also on organic soils in the EU and its member states. Furthermore, we argue that appropriate policy selection should consider current knowledge regarding the climate impacts of management options of organic soils. Lastly, we need more studies on GHG emissions, and standardized methods for GHG inventories, to resolve uncertainties surrounding the impacts of management to GHG emissions. Successful policy implementation requires more efforts but also improved scientific justification through continuous consideration of climate policy integrity and strengthening of the reliability of GHG inventories.

With the EU ETS 2 a new EU-wide emissions trading system is introduced that covers the greenhouse gas emission of the buildings and road transport sectors, i.e. sectors the decarbonization of which has so far been the responsibility of the Member States under the Effort Sharing Regulation. Since they will remain responsible for the achievement of their national greenhouse gas emission reduction targets under that regime, the question arises whether the Member States can maintain or introduce additional carbon pricing instruments alongside the new EU ETS 2. Hence, this paper examines the legality of such an approach, by assessing relevant provisions of EU secondary and primary law. Without going deep into the economic and political considerations, it concludes that from a legal perspective, the coexistence of national carbon pricing instruments and the EU ETS 2 is not prohibited.With the latest reform of the EU Emissions Trading System Directive (ETS Directive), the European Union (EU) has introduced a new EU emissions trading system for buildings and road transport (EU ETS 2)1. The decarbonization of those sectors traditionally falls within the responsibility of the EU Member States under the regime of the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR). The ESR introduces legally binding national greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets. Hence, over the last few years, the Member States have introduced different measures in order to reach their targets. Those include carbon pricing instruments, understood as measures that put a price on the emission of GHG and thus create an incentive to reduce those emissions. Carbon pricing instruments include carbon taxes, as well as emissions trading systems2. With the introduction of the new ETS 2, the question arises whether the Member States can maintain (or introduce) such national carbon pricing instruments in parallel to the new EU ETS 2.

The most powerful European Union (EU) member states have suffered devastating terrorist attacks in the past decades and identify Islamist terrorism as one of the most pressing threats to their national security. They recognize that instability in the southern neighbourhood has exacerbated the threat Islamist terrorism poses to their national security. Adopting an intergovernmental approach, I argue that member states’ southern strategies are a product of threat perceptions and policy response preferences. This article creates a typology of security strategies through using content analysis to categorize EU member states’ threat perceptions and policy response preferences as indicated in national security strategies produced in 2009–2018 period. Based on my analysis of member states’ threat perceptions and policy response preferences to threats emanating in the southern neighbourhood, I conceptualize three southern security strategies: restraint, preventative engagement, and selective intervention. Based on this typology, I identify the EU member states’ southern security strategy. Focusing particularly on the most powerful EU member states, namely the EU-5 , I then apply this typology to make some tentative predictions on the shifts in the EU’s southern strategy post-Brexit. I expect the EU’s southern security strategy to shift towards one of selective intervention in the post-Brexit period.

The European Green Deal (EGD) aims to transform the European Union (EU) into a climate neutral continent by 2050, requiring significant changes within carbon-intensive sectors. In this article, we examine EU Member States’ climate strategies in the aviation sector, where greenhouse gas emissions have doubled since 1990. We analyse EU National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) in order to examine national commitments on aviation. How frequently do EU Member States refer to aviation in their NECPs, and how can these references be understood thematically? First, by conducting a content analysis on all 54 draft and final NECPs, we identify how frequently 11 aviation-related terms were used. While all states increased the number of aviation references between their draft and final NECPs, Central and Eastern states showed the smallest increase. We show that Southern and Western Member States reference aviation most frequently in their final NECPs. Second, in our thematic analysis, we identify three key themes—‘contextual information’, ‘public policy’, and ‘fuels and propulsion’—that we divide into 17 sub-themes. Approximately half of the themes focused on contextual information, such as current aviation emissions, with the other half focusing on carbon reduction strategies, especially the EU Emissions Trading System, biofuels, and taxation. Western EU states provided the largest number of concrete policy statements on reducing aviation emissions and the promotion of biofuels. There were only two references to reducing the number of flights, across almost 7500 pages of climate documents. We conclude that the NECPs represent a promising means of conducting cross-country climate policy analysis, in order to compare efforts across economic sectors within Europe. With our analysis, we create a pre-pandemic sectoral baseline for aviation which can be used for further study.

In the European Union, greenhouse gas emissions statistics indicate only a slight decreasing trend over the last number of years in emissions from agricultural sources. Unless drastic action is taken in other sectors, the European Union’s 2030 and subsequent climate targets are unlikely to be met without greater reductions made in agricultural emissions. The policy instruments aimed at reducing agricultural emissions that are currently in place have proven to be ineffective; therefore, there is a need to look for new approaches towards bringing agricultural emissions down faster and farther. One obvious new approach is to integrate agricultural emissions into the European Union Emissions Trading System, which, so far, has proven very successful in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the energy and industrial sectors. Hardly any attention has been paid in the scholarly legal literature to the question of integrating agricultural GHG emissions into emission trading systems. This article seeks to fill this gap. This paper presents the concluding findings of a Dutch Research Council-funded research project that aimed to assess whether and under what conditions the European Union Emissions Trading System could play a role in compelling the agricultural sector to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. We answered this question by looking at lessons learned from existing examples in the world of market-based approaches to integrating agriculture into emission reduction schemes. To do this, we performed an ex-post assessment of three of the very few examples that exist in the world of such schemes in Canada, California, and Australia, followed by an ex-ante assessment of the prospect of including agricultural emissions under the European Union Emissions Trading System based on the practical experiences of those examples. In the ex-ante study, we evaluated how such inclusion could work, either indirectly, through allowing on-farm offset programs to reward increased carbon sequestration, or directly, by requiring farmers and/or other actors in the agricultural sector to surrender allowances for their direct emissions. As lawyers, we focused mainly on the legal considerations of such a proposition. Having conducted both the ex-ante and ex-post assessments, we conclude that introducing stricter legal instruments of one form or another that will reduce agricultural greenhouse gas emissions and increase carbon removal on agricultural land seems necessary for the European Union if it is serious about achieving its commitments under the Paris Agreement and meeting its obligations under its own Climate Law. The project makes a novel contribution to the legal scholarship in concluding that the most viable starting point for such stricter legislation would be to include methane and nitrous oxide emissions from livestock keeping and synthetic fertilizer use, respectively, under the European Union Emissions Trading System. To start with, this could be conducted by obliging meat and dairy processors and synthetic fertilizer producers to surrender allowances for the on-farm emissions associated with their products. This could be complemented by introducing a voluntary, but still highly regulated, carbon credits scheme that could encourage and reward farmers for reducing their own emissions and for transitioning to net-zero, and overall, more climate-resilient and environmentally friendly farming practices. Such credits could be offered for sale on the private carbon market as well as to Member State governments and the European Commission (through, for example, the Common Agricultural Policy, State Aid schemes, or the Innovation Fund).

Waste-to-Energy (WtE) incineration is a crucial part of modern waste management, providing safe waste disposal together with electricity and heat production. Future projections show that especially new European Union (EU) member states, who are trying to catch up with the economic growth, can expect further growth in waste amounts in the coming decades. At the same time, these countries are mostly landfilling their wastes, contributing to the worst environmental impacts and greenhouse gas emissions, while the EU is encouraging safe waste disposal and the diverting of waste from landfills. Many are therefore already struggling to live up to the rising environmental standards either because they are bound to the EU legislation or because of the increased environmental awareness of the citizens and of international standards in general. The capacities for Waste-to-Energy (WtE) treatment seem to be already saturated in some of the old member states. This has had a profound effect on the WtE market, which was continuously growing since 1995 but now seems to be losing its expansion pace. All eyes have therefore turned to countries with undercapacities in waste incineration, such as Great Britain, Italy and Spain on one hand, and Eastern and South Eastern European countries [some of them being EU member states already, some not (yet)] on the other. But the path to a second large expansion still has to face some challenges. One of them is overcoming the Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY) effect—a few countries of the former Eastern bloc will need some time to forget the bad memories of past environmental abuse due to the harsh industrialization. They will also need to inform themselves better of new innovative technologies. Many of them also suffer from limited financial means, less stable economies and lack the basic data to establish future plans in the field of waste. Nonetheless, the future role of WtE in Europe, may it be in the East or West, is certain. WtE completes a fully matured waste management system, enabling the waste producer to choose the best possible treatment option. With WtE, waste becomes an important source of renewable energy, mitigating the climate change effects and saving earth’s valuable resources and raw materials. The second WtE expansion will therefore be a part of the new era with resource independent and climate neutral societies, leaving the fossil-based economy in the past.KeywordsEuropean UnionWaste ManagementMunicipal Solid WasteWaste IncinerationIncineration PlantThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Disagreements between European Union (EU) member states constrain the Union’s capacity to manage conflicts such as Kosovo-Serbia. While Kosovo has long received EU support, five EU member states do not recognise its independence. How does the EU manage to work around member states’ vetoes and mitigate contestation? In contrast to previous scholarship, the analysis of the EU enlargement process and visa liberalisation, the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and the EULEX mission illustrate how institutional, technical and diplomatic solutions have allowed the provision of support to Kosovo, despite internal disagreements. EU member states have delegated to EU institutions the responsibility of overseeing day-to-day conflict management and integration policies concerning Kosovo and Serbia. EU institutions also use technical and constructively ambiguous language to manage conflicts and navigate the absence of political consensus regarding Kosovo’s statehood. Additionally, the EU has fostered diplomatic collaboration with the United States (US) and with actors from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to navigate through the Kosovo-Serbia conflict.