Abstract
Psycholinguistic research has shown that, with appropriate context, people take no longer to understand metaphors than to understand semantically comparable literal language. This finding is often taken to suggest that identical mental processes drive the comprehension of both literal and metaphorical utterances. We suggest that this claim does not necessarily follow from the experimental results. Various masking processes could foster the "incorrect illusion" of equivalence. However, a parsimonious account of the processes underlying comprehension can be motivated for both metaphorical and literal utterances. What makes metaphor "special" is in the products of comprehension, not in the process by which metaphorical meanings are understood.
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