Abstract

Exploiting random assignment of a conditional cash transfers (CCT) program in rural Nicaragua, we study how parents use additional resources to invest in their child development. We show that resources under the control of mothers with stronger bargaining power do not have a more beneficial impact. The estimated treatment effects are mainly driven by an overall change in knowledge of parents toward child rearing practices. In light of the theoretical model that guides the empirical analysis, we can conclude that there is no evidence that mothers have a larger marginal willingness to pay than fathers for children.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.