Abstract
I will argue that the two statements can be reconciled by Parsons's view which is inspired by a Meinongian ontology. I will assume these views together with Parsons's classification of fictional properties as ‘nuclear’ and ‘extra-nuclear’. This division of properties into types eliminates the requirement for the view to associate an object with a set of properties { goldenness, mountain-hood, existence } which is important as there is no existent golden mountain. I will throughout use italics for the names of properties and braces for sets. The titular question is a well-known problem for views of ficta since it appears that we believe both claims are true but they seem to be inconsistent. I understand 'ficta' to be any object or person described in fiction. I will argue that we can resolve the tension by adopting Parsons's view of ficta.
Highlights
The problem with the two statements about Sherlock Holmes is that we want to say that both of them are true but it looks like they cannot both be true at the same time
When we say ‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle’, we mean that ‘the set associated with ‘Sherlock Holmes’ was specified by Conan Doyle’; this is true, but has application in the domain of abstracta2
‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle’ means that Conan Doyle through his work specified the set of properties associated with the term ‘Sherlock Holmes’
Summary
How can we reconcile the following apparent truths: ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle’?. I will argue that the two statements can be reconciled by Parsons's view which is inspired by a Meinongian ontology. I will assume these views together with Parsons's classification of fictional properties as ‘nuclear’ and ‘extra-nuclear’. This division of properties into types eliminates the requirement for the view to associate an object with a set of properties {goldenness, mountain-hood, existence} which is important as there is no existent golden mountain. I understand 'ficta' to be any object or person described in fiction. I will argue that we can resolve the tension by adopting Parsons's view of ficta
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