How can regulators affect corporate social responsibility? Evidence from regulatory disclosures of consumer complaints in the U.S.

Abstract

Regulators are increasingly seeking ways to incentivize firms to improve corporate social responsibility (CSR) while minimizing criticism of direct interventions in firm behavior. This study takes advantage of two exogenous regulatory shocks initiated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in the US. In 2011, the CFPB enabled the private filing of consumer complaints against financial firms, and in 2013, these complaints were publicly disclosed. Our findings reveal a positive association between consumer complaints and subsequent CSR performance of the targeted financial firms (referred to as focal firms). Notably, this association becomes significant only after the public disclosure of complaints. Furthermore, we observe a spillover effect on the CSR performance of non-focal firms operating in the same area as the focal firms. Collectively, these findings suggest that mandatory disclosure of consumer complaints is one effective regulatory strategy to motivate both focal and non-focal firms to enhance their CSR performance.