Abstract
ABSTRACTCurrent definitions of joy are afflicted by jingle-jangle fallacies. Definitions fail to distinguish joy from other positive emotions (e.g. happiness), explanatory styles (e.g. optimism), and traits (e.g. positive emotionality facet of extraversion), or they are low in scientific utility because they require normative standards by which to judge if people feel ‘rightly’ that are difficult to operationalize. We propose researchers should abandon attempts to define joy primarily as an emotion or disposition. Instead, we propose two alternative conceptualizations. First, joy might be defined as a virtue whereby it entails characteristic adaptations (i.e. habits) that support the regular occurrence of positive emotions connected to a narrative identity that values something transcendent (e.g. beyond-the-self). Second, joy might be conceptualized as a telos, or outcome, of the virtuous life. Additional data are needed to adjudicate which definition of joy most useful for scientific inquiry.
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