How Can Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Public–Private Partnership Projects Performance Compensate during the Operation Period? A Two-Stage Perspective of Recycling and Remanufacturing

Abstract

Research in the field of project management has focused on recycling construction and demolition waste (CDW). However, the problem of how to compensate for the performance of CDW recycling public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operation period has not been resolved. This paper aims to reveal the compensation mechanism during the operation period of CDW recycling PPP projects considering the two-stage performance of recycling and remanufacturing. This paper takes CDW recycling PPP projects as the research object and uses the Stackelberg game and principal-agent theory to establish and solve the master-slave game decision model of CDW recycling PPP projects. The main conclusions are as follows. When social welfare is maximized, the performance compensation coefficients in the recycling and remanufacturing stages are the same and have homogeneity. In addition, the compensation policy positively promotes the two-stage performance, social capital profit and social welfare of the recycling and remanufacturing of CDW recycling PPP projects. This paper not only broadens the application knowledge system of the relevant knowledge of project management in the field of CDW recycling but also provides new evidence for principal-agent theory from the operation stage of CDW recycling PPP projects.