How Bosnia Armed: The Birth and Rise of the Bosnian Army by Marko Attila s> Hoare (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 543 funding for the programme and would continue to do so down to I988. Reagan, moreover, triedto give a bigger 'impulse'(pp. 68, 70) to the faltering arms reduction talksat Geneva. The summits, despite false starts,resultedin solid achievements. Probably the most importantwas the Soviet acceptance at the Washington summit of the 'zero option' and the removal of Russian intermediaterange nuclearforces (INF)from Europe. Reagan refusedto halt work on SDI because he genuinely believed that its defensive shield would eliminate nuclear weapons. Gorbachev (who believed that Reagan's offer to share SDI research, though sincere, would never be realized) gradually changed his tactics. He stopped frontal assaults on SDI, hoping that the concessions he made, especiallyover INF, would lead to an acceptance of the wisdom of the ABM Treaty. Arguably the existence of SDI hindered the signingof even more ambitioustreatiesto get rid of nuclearweapons, though its development also ensured the Soviet presence and an urgent readinessto reach such concordatsthat had previouslybeen lacking. Consequently, Duric concludes sensiblythat SDI contributedto the rapid dissolutionof the Soviet Union 'butit does not explain everything'(p. I28). It represented a technological and economic leap that served to expose as fraudulentthe Soviet Union's claimsto Superpowerstatus.Yetthe issue as Americanwealth and power continues to grow in relationto otherpowers has not been resolved. George W. Bush'scommitment to the national missile defence system(NMD) hasbeen obscuredby the attention and criticism devoted to his conduct of the 'waron terror'.Duric has only told the firstpart of what might turnout to be a long story,but she has told it well. Department of WarStudies BRIAN HOLDEN REID King's College London Hoare, Marko Attila. HowBosniaArmed: TheBirthandRiseoftheBosnian Army. Saqi Books in association with The Bosnian Institute, London, 2004. I72 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography.Index. fCI.99. THEvast amount of literaturegenerated as a resultof the Yugoslavwar in the I990S fails to deal comprehensivelywith the problem of armed forces in that war. HowBosnia Armed successfullyfillspart of this importantgap by mapping outthe creationandevolutionof theBosnianMuslimArmy(ArmijaRepublike Bosne i Herzegovine ARBiH) from the break-upof Yugoslaviain I99I to the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995. It establishesthe originsof the ARBiH and looks at its evolution throughoutthe war, all the while settingit in the context of the Serbian preparations for the war and the Yugoslav People's Army's (JNA) decision to place itselfon the sideof the Serbs.Hence thebook provides the audience with an essential element in understanding the nature of the Yugoslavconflict, and a well-argued and well-documented historyof the key instrumentof the Bosnianpolicy. As Marko Attila Hoare notes, the ARBiH is one of the least known and talked about forces in the former Yugoslavia.Its origins are complex and its composition and coherence remained in flux throughout the conflict. The origins of the ARBiH can be found in the Doctrine of General People's 544 SEER, 83, 3, 2005 Defence which was devised to imitatethe successof the Partisanmovement in the Second WorldWarand by which all elements of the population would be engaged in the struggleagainstan occupation force. The ARBiH was founded by an amalgamationof forcesloyal to the Izetbegoviegovernmentin Sarajevo and as such lacked the resourcesavailable to the Army of Republika Srpska. It also lacked coherent organization and an efficient command structure. Nevertheless, despite its clear inferiorityin terms of arms and organization, theARBiH managed to preventthe SerbianforcesfromoverrunningSarajevo and by I995 secureda number of victorieswhich, accordingto Hoare, would have brought the Serbs to their knees had a political decision not been made to leave the conflictunresolved. The impact of political decisions on the development of the ARBiH is well documented in the book. The wavering of the Bosnian leadership under Izetbegovic, its earlyindecisions and the political infightingall contributedto weaken the army. In addition, the foundation of the ARBiH from a combination of the Territorial Defence forces (TO) still loyal to the government in Sarajevo, the Patriotic League (the militia of the Party of Democratic Action SDA led by Izetbegovic)and the Ministryof Interior forces led to the turf wars and disagreements which jeopardized the operationaleffectivenessof theARBiH. The arrivalin April 1992 of a number of JNA officers who decided to join the ARBiH led to an atmosphere of distrust. Hoare notes at various times the general...