How Attentional Cognitive Penetration Works

Abstract

After having presented the theory of attention that I endorse in this book, I can now turn to my primary research question, namely: can attentional processes generate cognitively penetrated experiences? In this chapter, I offer a positive answer to this question in the light of the biased competition theory of attentional processes and of the four definitions of cognitive penetrability introduced earlier in the book. Section 6.1 examines why attentional processes are typically dismissed from the possible interesting instances of cognitive penetration. In Sect. 6.2, I argue that attentional competition processes are metacognitive processes, which constitutes a novel approach to attention and helps to reject the dismissive attitude toward attention. In Sect. 6.3, I discuss whether attentional processes can satisfy the definitions of semantic, causal, and indirect non-conceptual cognitive penetrability. Section 6.4 is dedicated to the epistemic role of attention and the definition of consequentialist cognitive penetrability.