How are fictions given? Conjoining the \u2018artifactual theory\u2019 and the \u2018imaginary-object theory\u2019

Michela Summa

doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03396-x

Abstract

According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.

Highlights

Do fictional objects, such as Little Red Riding Hood, Wonderland, or Humbert Humbert, exist? And, if they do, what is their ontological status? Is there a relation between the mode of existence and the mode of givenness of fictional objects? These and similar questions have been largely debated in the philosophy of fiction
Can be understood as intensional contexts obtained by means of appropriate operators, and they do not require what is represented in the statement to exist
Reassessing the imaginative constitution of fictional objects in the light of the results of the artifactual theory allows us to correct some controversial claims made by Sartre, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism

Summary

Introduction

Do fictional objects, such as Little Red Riding Hood, Wonderland, or Humbert Humbert, exist? And, if they do, what is their ontological status? Is there a relation between the mode of existence and the mode of givenness of fictional objects? These and similar questions have been largely debated in the philosophy of fiction. Among the non-eliminativist approaches, Amy Thomasson’s (1999) stands out for developing an ontological theory of fictional objects as abstract artifacts According to this theory, fictional objects are notably irreducible to the standard dichotomy between real and ideal objects and should be rather assimilated to cultural objects as abstract artifacts and socially constituted entities. The theoretical question raised by Thomasson’s demarcation between her own approach to the ontology of fiction and Sartre’s is whether considering fictional objects as imaginatively given and constituted means to rule out their existence as abstract artifacts in our real world. I discuss in what ways imaginative activity is required in order to account for the specific modes of givenness and constitution of fictional objects (Sect. 4)

Fictional entities as abstract artifacts: an ontology of dependence

The ontology of fiction and the problem of givenness and constitution

Fictional entities and their imaginative givenness

Conclusion: toward an integration