Abstract

Abstract : As early as World War I, the United States possessed a vision for how to eliminate the propensity of interstate warfare. Actually achieving this vision proved difficult until after World War II. Then, US policy makers used a mix of security, economic, and regional incentives to bring their global vision into fruition. The 1948 Marshall Plan balanced the priorities of Italy's local security, economic, and regional security concerns to be effective. Immediately following the Italian landing operations, the Allies used civil affairs to re-establish the rule of law and secure the population. Believing economic competition ultimately led states to war, the United States then established international institutions to quell economic favoritism in Italy. When these Bretton Woods institutions proved insufficient, the United States then looked for a stimulus and modernization program to rebuild Italy and Europe. The purpose of this stimulus in the form of the Marshall Plan was to make recipient states capable of self-sufficient operation. The stimulus aimed to create regions insusceptible to alternative forms of government, namely communism. The enormous financial and political investment in the Marshall Plan required US policy makers to justify the costs to a skeptical public, one that sometimes failed to see the immediate connection between financial aid and security. Linking the Marshall Plan to the idea of containing the spread of communism allowed its passage and helped save Italy. The context and cost of the Marshall Plan make it a singularly unique type of US diplomacy. This same criteria provides a caution to those that advocate its re-application to modern problems.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call