Abstract
Many companies listed in China adopted anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) in their Articles of Association in the recent years. Although the existing regulatory regime does not clearly address the legitimacy of most defensive tactics, the Chinese regulatory authorities implicitly allow such ATPs. This thesis reveals that the widely adopted ATPs can effectively impede potential takeovers and provide undue protection to inefficient incumbent directors and dominant shareholders. The development of an active corporate control market will be significantly delayed if such ATPs are condoned. This thesis argues that the use of ex ante takeover defences should not be allowed. A new regulatory regime for takeover defences in China is also proposed.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
