Host Government Intervention and FDI Inflow: An Empirical Investigation

Abstract

This study examines the effect of host government interference with foreign investors’ assets on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. The author hypothesizes that the relationship between host government interference and FDI inflow takes the form of an inverted U shape. The author tests this hypothesis using data from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes between 1996 and 2017. The results support the above hypothesis. While host government interference with the assets of a few foreign investors may not deter FDI inflow, frequent interferences, which result in an increasing number of host state–foreign investor disputes, reduces FDI inflow in a host country. The analysis also shows that when faced with an increasing host country uncertainty, investors adopt a wait and see strategy. However, how long investors wait depends on the economic situation of the host country. For high-income countries, investors wait until approximately 10 disputes before reducing investments level in a host country, while for low-income countries, this waiting period is a mere two disputes. The findings of this study suggest that countries seeking to attract more FDI should not interfere with the activities of foreign investors, however, if they do, disputes should be settled at home, not in international arbitration courts, because doing so frequently may poison the host environment and deter other foreign investors from investing in the host country.