Abstract
We develop a model of public-private hospital competition under regulated prices, recognizing that hospitals are multi-service firms and that equilibria depend on the interactions of patients, hospital administrators, and physicians. We then use data from China to calibrate a simulation model of the impact of China's recent payment and organizational reforms on cost, quality and access. Both the analytic and simulation results show how providing implicit insurance through distorted prices leads to over/under use of services by profitability, which in turn fuels cost escalation and reduces access for those who cannot afford to self-pay for care. Simulations reveal the benefits of mixed payment and expanded insurance cover for mitigating these distortions.
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