Horn, Sahel and Rift: fault-lines of the African jihad

Abstract

Stig Jarle Hansen brings years of experience, including field research in the Congo, Egypt, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda, to bear on a thought-provoking analysis of jihadist organizations in Africa. He argues that these organizations seldom disappear; instead, when faced with adversity, they transform themselves, substituting one form of territorial presence for another. The type of territorial presence varies from one African jihadist organization to another, and it also varies over the history of any one organization. Understanding these differences is central to viewing jihadist groups in Africa as dynamic bodies, experiencing immense changes. To make the point, Hansen develops a four fold typology of territorial presence for the jihadist groups analysed here. The clandestine network is the most commonly studied form of jihadist organization. It generally consists of small, cell-based structures and is normally the entry-level form of territorial presence. In the second scenario, known as accepted presence, the state hosts a jihadist organization in its territory, often manipulating it for its own purposes. In this form of presence, the jihadists may participate in violent acts outside the core areas of the state, but not within the confines of the state itself. In the third scenario, semi-territorial presence, the jihadist group exercises some level of control over part of the state, such as rural areas where the state and international forces are unable to provide security. ‘Semi-territoriality illustrates how these jihadist organizations do not need full control of a territory to implement rudimentary forms of governance, contrary to the conclusions of many scholars analysing rebel governance’ (p. 28). In the fourth and final scenario, territorial control, the jihadists have been able to establish stable control over an area for some time and have begun to build more permanent, public institutions of governance.