Abstract
I find on average firms respond to a horizontal merger by investing less in PP&E, labor, and R&D. There is notable heterogeneity among the non-merging rivals. The laggard rivals reduce investments in PP&E, labor, and R&D while the neck-and-neck rivals do the opposite. There is an insignificant change for the leader rivals. These results support Aghion et al. (2005) on the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. Also, I show evidence that financial constraints and innovativeness are two factors that drive rivals’ heterogeneous responses. This empirical study sheds light upon the pattern in which horizontal mergers shape industry evolvement.
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