Abstract
AbstractBiologists have mostly studied under what circumstances honest signaling is stable. Stability, however, is not sufficient to explain the emergence of honest signaling. We study the evolution of honest signaling between selfish, adaptive individuals and observe that honest signaling can emerge through learning. More importantly, honest signaling may emerge in cases where it is not evolutionary stable. In such cases, honesty and dishonesty co-exist. Furthermore, honest signaling does not necessarily emerge in cases where it is evolutionary stable. We show that the latter is due to the existence of other, more important equilibria and that the importance of equilibria is related to Pareto-optimality.
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