Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism

Abstract

In the last 50 pages of How Free Are You? (Oxford, 1993), a summary of his impressive two volume work A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life-Hopes (Oxford, 1988), Ted Honderich considers the debate between the compatibilists and incompatibilists concerning the consequences of determinism. I extract the following nine theses: [1] We have an image of ourselves as undetermined originators of actions in a cosmos with an open future. This image supports life-hopes that we may be able to overcome the influence of heredity and environment. These lifehopes are the basis for incompatibilist theories of freedom and are widely felt: Does anyone really doubt having or being able to have this kind of very natural hope? If so, they can stop doubting by contemplating what would be like really not to have it (83). [2] Determinism, by definition, is logically inconsistent with the undetermined, open futures that we imagine when we attend to our incompatibilist life-hopes. [3] When we attend to [2], the thought that determinism might be true produces feelings of dismay. [4] We have another set of life-hopes that require only that our actions be voluntary, but not indeterministically originated. When we attend to these hopes, our wish is that our actions proceed from embraced rather than reluctant desires, actions done in satisfying and not frustrating circumstances (86). [5] Determinism is logically consistent with our actions being voluntary. [6] When we attend to [5], the thought that determinism might be true produces feelings of satisfied intransigence: Everything is okay. Nothing changes (86). [7] Adopting either attitude of dismay or intransigence in response to the possibility of determinism involves no intellectual error: There is no mistake and nothing to stop me from taking just the thought of a fully voluntary action as a reason for a feeling, and no mistake or anything that stops me from also requiring an originated action for a feeling (90). [8] Attitudes are neither true nor false: An attitude is an evaluative thought of something (81) and