Abstract
Ted Honderich has made a very significant contribution to the debate about free will and determinism, in particular in his important book, A Theory of Determinism (Honderich, A Theory of Determinism, Oxford University Press, 1988). I share his general perspective on this issue, which, like mine, is in the Spinozist camp (Spinoza, The Collected Works of Spinoza, Princeton University Press, 1677/1985), and I also agree with many of its specific features. His account of the aspects of our practice of holding moral responsibility that would have to be given up and which can be retained is nuanced and powerful. This is the part of the project that I have addressed in past works (Pereboom, Living without Free Will, Cambridge University Press, 2001; Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford University Press, 2014). Here, I will recount and expand on what I said there.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
