Homonymy, Polysemy and Synonymy: Reflections on the Notion of Voice

Abstract

This article, which falls within the field of the history and epistemology of literary theories, and more particularly of theories of narrative, is divided into two parts. first part is devoted to the theories of narrative (the expression is borrowed from a 1975 article by S.-Y. Kuroda). It analyzes the relations of homonymy and synonymy related to the concept of in the theories of Gerard Genette (1972 and 1983), Seymour Chatman (1978) and Franz Stanzel (1984 [1979]) (as well as asking why Lubomir Dolezel does not use the concept in his work published in 1973). I show that Genette employs two concepts of which differ in both origin and nature: as a category of narrative analysis (including time, person and narrative levels, in other words heterogeneous linguistic and textual realities) and as a synonym for narrative enunciation or narration (in this sense refers to the narrator speaking in the first person, see Genette, 1980 [1972], p. 244: The narrator can only exist in his narrative, like any subject of enunciation in his statement, 'in the first person'[...]). There are therefore two separate concepts, the relation between the two being one of homonymy. However, their homonymy does involve some synonymy in the case of the person, the reduction of which to the first person summarizes Genette's communicationalist argument. I then compare the concept(s) of in Genettian narratology and in Chatman's narrative theories (in whose work can be defined as the product of the reader's quest for the origin of the text, and is more or less synonymous with the overt or covert narrator) as well as Stanzel's (who seldom employs the concept of voice, but replaces it with those of narrative mediation and, implicitly, distortion, in relation to his historical and theoretical proposition for a tripartite typology of fictional narrative). second part is devoted to S.-Y. Kuroda and Ann Banfield's critique of communicational theories of narrative in the case of narrative fiction. Kuroda was the first to explore the linguistic foundations of the theory of narrative and to question the axiomatic status of the narrator in narratology. He does not employ the concept of voice; however, an implicit critique of the concept can be seen in his criticism of John R. Ross's performative analysis, according to which all sentences derive from a profound structure involving a first-person performative verb. Banfield, for her part, proves the inadequacy of the double voice theory in free indirect discourse (represented speech and thought to use her terminology). For Banfield, As long as a third person subjectivity is represented, no speaking can be realized (Banfield 1991: 26). It is clear that in Banfield's work, the author, who is responsible for writing the represented words and thoughts, is not considered as a speaking voice. In conclusion, I question the possibility of conserving the concept of in any narrative theory which aims to be scientific, or at least rigorous, since hunting down homonyms is, in my view, the primary requisite of logic, if not also of ethics, in scientific language.