Homo duplex revisited: A defence of Émile Durkheim’s theory of the moral self

Abstract

Over the years arguments focusing on process have gained ascendancy over traditional dualist arguments in various areas of sociological inquiry, including that of the moral self. This paper challenges current convention by offering a defence of Émile Durkheim’s now largely discredited dualism-based homo duplex theory of the moral self by engaging it in a dialogue with one key exponent of the rival process view on this theme, namely the American pragmatist thinker George Herbert Mead. A seminal essay published in 1909 by one of Durkheim’s former students, the anthropologist Robert Hertz, will be drawn upon when arguing for the continued relevance of binary or dualistic thought, contra Mead, and, by extension, Durkheim’s classical homo duplex theory. The idea of a ‘dynamic dualism’ will be introduced in the face of Mead’s critical claims as a way forward for binary thought in future sociological debate.