Hometown bias in Flanders: the impact of ministerial local embeddedness on the distribution of conditional grants (2004–2017)

Abstract

ABSTRACT Are grants strategically allocated to towns where ministers live? This question is investigated using panel data covering four legislative periods and 293 Flemish municipalities. The findings provide clear evidence of hometown bias. Ministerial careers related to local embeddedness explain differences in received conditional grants. Ministers, who were once mayors, started their careers locally or predominantly developed upper-level careers to bring more resources to their hometowns. Conversely, ministers, recruited from outside politics, do not generate extra resources. During local election years, ministers in key positions on local lists (leader or pusher) also secure significantly more funding. Investigating grants during federal, regional, and local election years consistently reveals significant hometown bias. This trend persists across various ministerial career trajectories, particularly for ministers who began their careers locally or served as mayors, highlighting the impact of ministerial local embeddedness on grant distribution.