Hobbes’s and Zabarella’s Methods: A Missing Link

Abstract

A common point of departure for interpreting Hobbes’ philosophical/scientific method is Jacopo Zabarella’s regressus which lies squarely in the Aristotelian Posterior Analytics tradition developed at the University of Padua, in the sixteenth century. Whereas parallels between Hobbes’ philosophical method and the geometrical methods of analysis and synthesis also receive attention, the differences in Hobbes’ presentation of each are significant: hence the Paduan reading that ties Hobbes’ philosophical method to Zabarella’s regressus retains its currency. In this paper, I argue that the Paduan reading of Hobbes relies on an overly narrow understanding of Zabarella’s method, and tends to identify his scientific method with one small component, the regressus . Zabarella’s writings on method, broadly speaking, influence subsequent philosophers, most notably Protestant logicians relevant to Hobbes’ context, who take up and develop Zabarella’s discussion of method as order. I show that interpreting Hobbes’ method within this fuller context has three distinct advantages over the Paduan reading. Firstly, it saves Hobbes from the charge of being inconsistent to his stated method in his particular explanations of natural and political phenomena. Secondly, it advances our understanding of the sense in which his method would have been regarded as ‘mathematical’ although it remains non-quantitative. Thirdly, my approach illuminates Hobbes’ odd combination of Aristotelian and geometrical elements within his philosophical system.