Hobbes on the Basis of Political Obligation

Abstract

THIS ESSAY* IS DEVOTED to showing that Hobbes was not an egoist and to explaining the consequences of this discovery for other interpretations and criticisms of his account of political obligation. 1 1 have divided the body of the essay into four parts: (1) I show that Hobbes held that we are morally obligated to perform those acts which conduce to self-preservation. (2) I show (a) that he distinguished between what is necessary for self-preservation alone and what furthers self-interest generally and (b) that he believed the transition to civil society could be based on the former but not on the latter. (3) I discuss the consequences of this interpretation for criticisms of his account of the grounds of political obligation. (4) I comment on the consequences this reinterpretation has on the plausibility of Hobbes 's view of the extent of our political obligations. A few preliminary remarks are in order about the use of such terms as and ethical egoism. Those interpreters and critics of Hobbes who feel that these labels are appropriate regard Hobbes as holding that we are obl igated--a t least in the state of nature-to do whatever is in our own self-interest. More importantly, they are agreed that if Hobbes holds that we are obligated to do less than this, i.e., that our moral obligations do not extend to all these acts, then Hobbes is not an egoist. To what extent this egoism is enlightened, to what extent it involves general rules, to what extent prudence dictates conduct which rule-egoism does not, and vice-versa, are not my concern here, for what Hobbes says in this respect is sufficiently clear to show that neither a self-interest morality nor a rational prudence morality applies--regardless of the qualifications one might add to these views.