Hitler's Shadow Empire. Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War by Pierpaolo Barbieri, and: Great Men in the Second World War: The Rise and Fall of the Big Three by Paul Dukes, and: The Third Reich in History and Memory by Richard J. Evans, and: An Iron Wind. Europe Under Hitler by Peter Fritzsche, and: Implacable Foes. War in the

Abstract

Reviewed by: Hitler's Shadow Empire. Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War by Pierpaolo Barbieri, and: Great Men in the Second World War: The Rise and Fall of the Big Three by Paul Dukes, and: The Third Reich in History and Memory by Richard J. Evans, and: An Iron Wind. Europe Under Hitler by Peter Fritzsche, and: Implacable Foes. War in the Pacific, 1944–1945 by Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, and: The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture by Benjamin G. Martin, and: World War II at Sea: A Global History by Craig L. Symonds Jeremy Black Hitler's Shadow Empire. Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War. By pierpaolo barbieri. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. 368 pp. $22.50 (paper). Great Men in the Second World War: The Rise and Fall of the Big Three. By paul dukes. New York: Bloomsbury, 2017. 216 pp. $88.00 (hardcover). The Third Reich in History and Memory. By richard j. evans. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 496 pp. $18.95 (paper). An Iron Wind. Europe Under Hitler. By peter fritzsche. New York: Basic Books, 2016. 384 pp. $29.99 (hardcover). Implacable Foes. War in the Pacific, 1944–1945. By waldo heinrichs and marc gallicchio. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 728 pp. $34.95 (hardcover). The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture. By benjamin g. martin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. 370 pp. $39.95 (hardcover). World War II at Sea: A Global History. By craig l. symonds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 792 pp. $34.95 (hardcover). The Second World War, Again All of these books are interesting, but this is the Journal of World History, and I shall review them accordingly, and not with the space or approach that would be relevant were I reviewing for a journal of national or European history. It is, for example, very much the case that the excellent work that continues to come out on German history, on Fascist history, and on aspects of alliance, collaboration and occupation in German-occupied Europe generally fails to draw on parallels elsewhere in the world during this period, and notably so as far as Japanese policy and practice are concerned. Archival issues preclude direct comparisons, but there is much material available in English-language secondary literature and the situation is therefore disappointing. So also for the military aspect of the war and of the pre-war crises. There is some insightful comparative work, commonly on the part of multi-author collections. However, such work pales considerably in scale when compared to the mass of material that looks simply at one of the conflicts that composed the world war. That choice reflects the experience that many individuals had, but not the reality of the strategic dilemmas facing the major powers. Indeed, the war took on strategic weight in terms of a series of time-space equations, and there were very different levels of skill in the handling of these equations. The greatest success, with all the consequences in terms of the staging of operations and, therefore, taking advantage of the pressures and opportunities allowed by simultaneity and sequencing, was achieved by the United States. It and Britain had to confront the issues posed by war with a number of combatants across the world. Germany and Japan each had a number of combatants, but not across such a range. By not fighting Japan until August 1945, the Soviet Union was able to restrict its combatants, and that provided it with major opportunities. These differences were important to the situation discussed by Craig Symonds in his World War II at Sea, although he does not bring out the broader, let alone theoretical, implications of his subject. Moreover, Symonds devotes most of his attention to a customary chronology and a conventional cast. The United States dominates his account. In contrast, insufficient attention is devoted to the Soviet Union and to France. That is a major problem with much of the literature on naval history, but a focus on the leading power is not necessarily helpful. An awareness of the oceanic dimension is an aspect of the key element of geopolitics. This emerges in...