Historical Criticism in a ‘History-Centred Value-System’

Abstract

Abstract One circumstance which, more than any others, has controlled the discussion of the relation of faith to history, has been the assumption, held by both the theologians and the historical critics with whom they have been debating, that historical criticism is a single, and fairly simply identifiable, entity. Perhaps this assumption itself derives from a prior conviction that history itself is homogeneous and uniform, and that a uniform historical method can be applied to it right across the board. This assumption, it could be argued, was the common element, in the midst of their many theological differences, in the several attempts of theologians ranging from Kierkegaard to Pannenberg, to articulate the relation of faith to history. It is the task of this essay to look more closely at this assumption, to consider an alternative account of the matter; and thereafter, to examine the consequences for our understanding both of historical method and the kinds of criteria that it employs, and of theological method and its criterial options.