Abstract
This paper studies a politico-economic dynamic model of endogenous growth where the political conflict focuses on the amount of resources devoted to public education. We show that if people also have the choice between investing or not investing in private human capital, multiple equilibria in growth and income distribution may arise in the long run. An inegalitarian equilibrium may coexist with an egalitarian one, the initial distribution of income completely determining which equilibrium finally is reached. We then discuss the impact of temporary political accidents such as reduced political rights on the dynamics of growth and inequality.
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