Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks

Abstract

As a step toward further conceptualization and differentiation of the problem of surprise attacks, this article suggests a new framework for analyzing the assumptions of decision makers. Two main categories are distinguished: (i) strategic assumptions of possibilities—the explicit and implicit assumptions held by an “observing state” about the conditions and circumstances under which the “observed state” would strike; (2) tactical assumptions of actualities—assumptions that have become realities in the eyes of the observing state, or that are on the verge of realization. Five cases of failures in intelligence estimates are discussed: (1) the Barbarossa Operation; (2) the attack on Pearl Harbor; (3) the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; (4) the Sino-Indian Border War of October 1962; (5) the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973.The analysis indicates that in each case, when discrepancies existed between tactical assumptions of actualities and strategic assumptions of possibilities, the latter prevailed without reassessment of the situation.