High-throughput laboratories for Homeland and National Security.

Abstract

IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE that compared to nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are much less expensive to produce and use. It costs about $1 million to kill one person with a nuclear weapon, about $1,000 to kill one person with a chemical weapon, and about $1 to kill one person with a biological weapon. The low cost and minimal infrastructure needed to carry out bioattacks suggest that current and future terrorists will pursue this route. The world has witnessed dictators such as Saddam Hussein with biological weapons of mass destruction, and terrorist networks such as al Qaeda that call for jihad and waging asymmetric warfare. To this day, we do not know whether the perpetrator of the post-9/11 anthrax letter attack was an organized “bio bin Ladin” or a lone “bio Kaczynski” but either seems plausible. Because of extensive media coverage, however, we do know that the leaders of rogue nations and terrorist networks see biological attacks in more threatening ways. Conceivably, the post-9/11 anthrax letters may have represented a “test” that surpassed all expectations: It revealed that small bioattacks can overwhelm the public health system and induce ripple effects with enormous social and economic consequences. Worse yet, with current bioagent tracing capabilities, the risk of attribution appears to be small to nil. Intelligence reports that have been released to the public indicate that nations like Iraq and North Korea possess smallpox and, in all likelihood, in readily spreadable (i.e., weaponized) forms.1 A few plastic bags of powdered smallpox are easy to conceal and transport and, if released, would be capable of starting major epidemics that kill vast numbers of people. In the hands of rogue nations or terrorist networks, such materials constitute one of the ultimate weapons of mass destruction and/or instruments of biological blackmail.2 As a result, the United States is vaccinating military personnel serving in the Middle East and first responders at home against smallpox. The U.S. Congress is also allocating unprecedented sums of money for bioterrorism-related research, and the new Department of Homeland Security is mobilizing government agencies to work together. As a nation, we are awakening to the “biological genie” and struggling to put it back in the bottle. As we reshape our postures and defenses, new programs that increase our overall security must begin. The above remarks point to a few inescapable facts. Biological weapons and bioterrorism pose a significant threat to homeland and national security. The threat comes from rogue nations, international terrorist networks, and less sophisticated but still dangerous domestic groups and persons. The primary issue is that the United States must now devise a strategic plan to prevent, deter, and respond to the long-term threats. The plan must take advantage of our best scientific and technical know-how and support public health, homeland security, and national security efforts. So far, our efforts have focused on improving the care of potential biological victims. Across the country, they involve getting our neglected public health infrastructure, emergency medical services, hospitals, and doctors better prepared for man-made events and natural infectious disease outbreaks. At the same time, however, we must also build new capabilities that can prevent and deter bioattacks and, in case of crisis, help us to save lives. How would these capabilities take shape?