Abstract
This work presents efficient connection provisioning techniques mitigating high-power jamming attacks in spectrally-spatially flexible optical networks (SS-FONs) utilizing multicore fibers. High-power jamming attacks are modeled based on their impact on the lightpaths’ quality of transmission (QoT) through inter-core crosstalk. Based on a desired threshold on a lightpath’s QoT, the modulation format used, the length of the path, as well as a set of physical layer characteristics, each lightpath can potentially tolerate a high-power jamming attack. In this paper, an integer linear program is thus formulated, as well as heuristic algorithms to solve the problem of attack-aware routing, spectrum, modulation format, and core allocation in SS-FONs, aiming to both efficiently provision the network in terms of network resources, as well as minimize the impact of high-power jamming attacks on the established lightpaths. Extensive simulation results are obtained for several algorithm variants with different objectives, demonstrating the validity and efficiency of the proposed techniques that can effectively mitigate high-power jamming attacks, by minimizing the number of inter-core interactions, while at the same time establishing connections with high spectral efficiency.
Highlights
Elastic optical networks (EONs) that use finer spectrum granularity (frequency slots of 6.25, 12.5, and 25GHz compared to 50GHz of wavelength-division multiplexed (WDM) networks), in addition to transponders that can transmit data in several contiguous slots, have been proposed as a viable technology to address the increasing capacity crunch in optical networks [1]
To account for the physical-layer impairments (PLIs), our extended version of the Q-tool estimator proposed in [19] is used. This tool is able to calculate the quality of transmission (QoT) of new lightpaths to be established in the network, as well as the impact on the existing connections when setting up a new one, by taking into account the analytical models of linear and nonlinear impairments of SS-FONs
Where SNRXI is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) value accounting for the inter-channel crosstalk and the intersymbol interference in back-to-back measurements for different modulation formats and spectral widths of the signal and SNRlASE,NLI is the SNR corresponding to the amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) and non-linear interference (NLI) for link l and is equal to: SNRlASE,NLI
Summary
During the network design phase, different kinds of attack models can be considered, including a jamming attack that affects only the link on which it is inserted (i.e., thwarted at the node) – requiring, a higher deployment cost – or an attack that propagates along the connection (utilizing networks with a lower deployment cost) In this work, the latter attack scenario is assumed, where jamming attacks can affect every lightpath at every point of interaction. The goal would be to identify the ROADM design and associated components’ crosstalk specifications that will keep the network performance within acceptable limits In such a way, unnecessarily high-cost WSSs could be avoided and design flexibility would be allowed, as the chosen solution would be up to the network operator and the budget that has available in order to offer improved quality of service (QoS), in case that this is required by the service level agreements (SLAs).
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