Abstract

AbstractTrivium as a representative stream cipher has been adopted by ISO/IEC in 2012. It can be foreseen that Trivium will be widely used to achieve the goal of information security. In practice, probing attacks can be used to recover key bits used by an implementation of Trivium under the (glitch-extended) probing model. In light of this, higher-order masking scheme secure under the glitch-extended probing model should be proposed for Trivium. Inspired by the ideas of the DOM masking scheme proposed by Gross et al. and the CHES 2021 masking scheme proposed by Shahmirzadi et al., we propose two versions of higher-order masking scheme for Trivium. We analyze the security of two versions of higher-order masking scheme under the glitch-extended probing model. Then, the performance of two versions of higher-order masking scheme is evaluated on ASIC and FPGA with or without the pipeline technique, and meaningful observations are obtained. Overall, higher-order masking schemes that are secure under the glitch-extended probing model are proposed for Trivium and their performances are evaluated on typical hardware platforms.KeywordsTriviumHigher-order masking schemeSide-channel attacksGlitch-extended probing modelPerformance evaluation

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