High Non-GAAP Earnings Predict Abnormally High CEO Pay

Abstract

CEOs of S&P 500 firms that report high non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP earnings receive substantial unexplained pay. Crucially, this result remains even after controlling for the level of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings. These firms are relatively poor performers (i.e., low GAAP earnings and stock returns) and have less powerful CEOs, consistent with non-GAAP earnings being used as justification when high executive pay is more likely to cause outrage. Indeed, despite the lower GAAP and return performance, these firms are more likely to beat the earnings targets specified in their compensation plans, which likely increases investors’ perceptions of core operating earnings and reduces outrage. However, while the fraction of CEO pay that seems attributable to opportunistic non-GAAP reporting is economically meaningful, it is also limited, meaning that the bulk of CEO pay likely represents reward for performance.