HFBR restart activity A2.6: Review of FSAR and 60 MW addendum to assure consistency of operation at 40 MW

Abstract

The purpose of this task (HFBR Restart Activity A2.6) is to perform a review of the design basis accident (DBA) analyses sections of the 1964 HFBR-Final Safety Analysis Report; Volumes I and II, and the 1982 Addendum to the HFBR-FSAR for 60 MW operation to assure that operation at 40 MW will be consistent with these analyses. Additional documents utilized in the review included the Level 1 PRA for HFBR, HFBR-PDMs and HFBR-OPMs. The review indicates that the 1964 FSAR-DBA analysis in incomplete in the sense that it did not analyze some of the important initiators for 1-loop operation that include: Accidental throttling of primary flow control valves; seizure of primary pump; loss of secondary pump; accidental throttling of secondary flow control valves; rupture of secondary piping. The first three initiators were later studied in the 1982 addendum. The other two initiators have not been examined to-date for 1-loop operation. It is recommended that the impact of these initiators be assessed prior to the restart, if 1-loop operation is chosen for the restart. The review demonstrated that at 40 MW operation there are only a few accident initiators that will culminate in core damage (fuel melting and /or cladding failure) regardless of the availability of mitigating systems. For 1-loop Operation these accidents include: Fuel channel blockage, primary pump seizure, and large-large LOCA (a LOCA with effective break diameter > 2.81 in. is referred to as a large-large LOCA in this document as well as in PRA). Although all these accidents listed above could lead to core damage for 1-loop operation as well, the probability is expected be very low.