Abstract
This study investigates the effects of venture capital (VC) investment on newly listed firms' merger and acquisition activities and takes the lock-up period into consideration. We find that venture capitalists (VCs) tend to postpone M&A activities during a lock-up period, whereas the inhibition role recedes when the lock-up period expires. VCs with a longer investment period dominate this influence. We also illustrate how the market responds to the M&A announcements of VC-backed firms, with the response varying with VCs' investment period.
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