Heterogeneous groups cooperate in public good problems despite normative disagreements about individual contribution levels

Kasper Otten,Vincent Buskens,Wojtek Przepiorka,Naomi Ellemers

doi:10.1038/s41598-020-73314-7

Abstract

Norms can promote human cooperation to provide public goods. Yet, the potential of norms to promote cooperation may be limited to homogeneous groups in which all members benefit equally from the public good. Individual heterogeneity in the benefits of public good provision is commonly conjectured to bring about normative disagreements that harm cooperation. However, the role of these normative disagreements remains unclear because they are rarely directly measured or manipulated. In a laboratory experiment, we first measure participants’ views on the appropriate way to contribute to a public good with heterogeneous returns. We then use this information to sort people into groups that either agree or disagree on these views, thereby manipulating group-level disagreement on normative views. Participants subsequently make several incentivized contribution decisions in a public goods game with peer punishment. We find that although there are considerable disagreements about individual contribution levels in heterogeneous groups, these disagreements do not impede cooperation. While cooperation is maintained because low contributors are punished, participants do not use punishment to impose their normative views on others. The contribution levels at which groups cooperate strongly relate to the average normative views of these groups.

Highlights

Norms can promote human cooperation to provide public goods
Research suggests that the potential of norms to promote cooperation for public good provision may be limited to homogeneous groups in which individuals can contribute similar amounts and benefit from each other’s contributions
While homogeneous groups largely agree upon a single appropriate level of contributions, heterogeneity within groups brings about a plurality of different and conflicting views about how much group members should c ontribute[11]

Summary

Introduction

Norms can promote human cooperation to provide public goods. Yet, the potential of norms to promote cooperation may be limited to homogeneous groups in which all members benefit from the public good. We first measure participants’ views on the appropriate way to contribute to a public good with heterogeneous returns We use this information to sort people into groups that either agree or disagree on these views, thereby manipulating group-level disagreement on normative views. While homogeneous groups largely agree upon a single appropriate level of contributions, heterogeneity within groups brings about a plurality of different and conflicting views about how much group members should c ontribute[11]. This normative disagreement has been conjectured to harm cooperation. Countries have different interests and costs in jointly addressing global problems such as climate c hange[24] or the refugee crisis[25]

Methods

Results

Conclusion