Heterogeneous game resource distributions promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

Abstract

In social networks, individual abilities to establish interactions are always heterogeneous and independent of the number of topological neighbors. We here study the influence of heterogeneous distributions of abilities on the evolution of individual cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. First, we introduced a prisoner’s dilemma game, taking into account individual heterogeneous abilities to establish games, which are determined by the owned game resources. Second, we studied three types of game resource distributions that follow the power-law property. Simulation results show that the heterogeneous distribution of individual game resources can promote cooperation effectively, and the heterogeneous level of resource distributions has a positive influence on the maintenance of cooperation. Extensive analysis shows that cooperators with large resource capacities can foster cooperator clusters around themselves. Furthermore, when the temptation to defect is high, cooperator clusters in which the central pure cooperators have larger game resource capacities are more stable than other cooperator clusters.