Abstract
Our setting comprises one entrepreneurial firm with a growth opportunity seeking for external funding from a venture capitalist, where the entrepreneur and venture capitalist have homogeneous or heterogeneous beliefs about its growth prospects. We developed a real options model to determine the optimal ownership structure that triggers the simultaneous exercise of the growth option on the entrepreneurial firm by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Our results show that the more optimistic any of the parties is, the lower the post-money firm ownership that party will retain. However, optimism leads parties to delay their decision to invest in the entrepreneurial firm, by demanding higher profit triggers and investing only in more valuable entrepreneurial firms. The combination of these two effects leaves perceived returns on investment unchanged and not dependent on their own optimism.
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