Abstract
We examine heterogeneity in activist shareholder campaigns targeting Japanese companies following corporate governance reforms. In doing so we explore how both market reactions to activism and shareholder voting opposition to director appointments vary with activist and campaign characteristics. We find that market reactions to the revelation of the initial investment vary with heterogeneity across activists and their campaigns. We document similar variation in market reactions to the public announcement of activist demands, an issue that is relatively unexplored in prior work. Additionally, we find that voting opposition to director appointments tends to be larger in the presence of activists and varies with heterogeneity in activist shareholder characteristics.
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