Heterodox economics, social ontology and the use of mathematics

Abstract

According to Lawson (Chapter 1), based on his reading and advocacy of Thorstein Veblen’s original use of the term (Veblen, 1900), many heterodox economists (as much if not more so than most mainstream economists) are properly categorized as “neoclassical.” This is obviously a provocative claim, not least because heterodox economists see themselves as being in opposition to neoclassical economics. It may even appear reckless, given that heterodoxy is sometimes characterized by its critics as amounting to little more than a general opposition to neoclassical economics.1 But on closer inspection, Lawson’s claim deserves more careful attention. An important part of its substance is that heterodox economists’ widespread use of mathematics in economic theory is contradictory to their (implicit) open-systems ontology (Lawson, Chapter 1: 37-40).2 The purpose of this chapter is to address this criticism directly and suggest that it need not be correct: there need be no contradiction between the use of mathematics and adherence to the ontological postulate that the economy is an open system.