Hermann Cohen’s Theory of Virtue

Abstract

Cohen’s ethical theory of virtue, comprising the last seven chapters of the Ethik des reinen Willens, has long been neglected in the discussion of Cohen’s practical philosophy. This has changed in recent years with the revival of theories of virtue as a whole. However, whereas these new attempts at a theory of virtue can largely be seen as a critique of a universalist ethics based on principles, Cohen’s theory of virtue should be read from the outset as supplementing his ethics of principles. He therefore holds a weak theory of virtue, i.e. one which emphasizes the orientation of ethics to principles, but also makes it clear that without a discourse on human virtue this ethics is meaningless. Like Kant in his theory of virtue, Cohen is concerned to lay bare the motivational grounds of good action. He is therefore concerned to discover the conditions for individual moral action. Yet this is not enough. Going far beyond Kant’s theory of virtue, Cohen’s theory also contains a historical-philosophical dimension, a dimension ultimately connected with Cohen’s messianic conception of the ideal. This historical-philosophical dimension of Cohen’s ethics is pre-eminently expressed in his theory of virtue, which examines the subjective side of historical-philosophical optimism. Because the theory of virtue reveals the subjective basis of certainty for the progress of morality, a basis missed by many interpreters, the problem of the application of ethics is completely solved. In the virtues Cohen discovers a necessary condition for individual moral action. They help to enable and stabilize the other condition: the need to adopt a moral position. In what follows I will discuss Cohen’s theory of virtue in three sections. Starting from