HENRY KISSINGER’IN 1973 ARAP-İSRAİL SAVAŞI ESNASINDAKİ DIŞ POLİTİKA SÖYLEMİNDE ORYANTALİZM

Abstract

This article examines Henry Kissinger’s foreign policy discourse during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War through a Critical Discourse Analysis. The central theme of the article is whether Henry Kissinger had Orientalist conceptions as a decision maker in U.S. foreign policy during this event in 1973. In order to provide a theoretical framework, Critical Discourse Analysis and Edward Said’s definition of Orientalism are discussed in the first and second parts. In the last part, a Critical Discourse Analysis is utilized to uncover the ideas that Henry Kissinger, who was the main figure in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, has not expressed openly. For this purpose, official historical documents such as policy documents, memorandum of conversations, transcripts of telephone calls, meeting minutes and anecdotes regarding U.S. foreign policy decisions in the relevant period are used. As the 1973 Arab-Israeli War emerged, derogatory terms, acts of dehumanization and miscalculations are found to exist with Henry Kissinger in the decision-making processes. Thus, it is concluded that Kissinger had indeed preconceived ideas that fit Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism.