Abstract
This article discusses the three Europes that informed Kissinger’s narrative of world affairs and Transatlantic relations: Europe as history offering vital lessons the USA was called to study and master; Europe as a junior (and subaltern) ally of the USA; Europe as the primary Cold War theater and, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the object of superpowers’ detente. The article highlights how these three narratives were used in the attempt to build a new domestic consensus around a foreign policy still driven by basic Cold War imperatives, the limits and contradictions of this attempt, and its ultimate failure.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
