Abstract
In (1959), Carnap famously attacked Heidegger for having constructed an insane metaphysics based on a misconception of both logical form and semantics of ordinary language. In what follows, it will be argued that, once one appropriately (i.e., in a Russellian fashion) reads Heidegger's famous sentence that should paradig- matically exemplify such a misconception, i.e., the nothing nothings, there is nothing either logically or semantically wrong with it. The real controversy as to how that sen- tence has to be evaluated—not as to its meaning but as to its truth—lies at meta- physico-ontological level. For in order for sentence to be true one has to endorse an ontology of impossibilia and Leibniz's principle of identity of indiscernibles.
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