Heidegger's Concept of Truth (review)

Abstract

One of the bold claims advanced in this book is that many of the immanent criticisms of Heidegger's project stem from a failure to adequately understand the role and meaning of truth in that project. Daniel Dahlstrom has written a highly accomplished and detailed scholarly account of the scope and consequences of [End Page 297] Heidegger's radical engagement during the 1920s with "the logical prejudice," that is, the assumption "that assertions and their kin are the site of truth" (xvi). Dahlstrom's recognition of Heidegger's "more fundamental" truth of the disclosedness of Dasein is, of course, nothing new. What the book claims to contribute to our understanding of Heidegger's concept of truth consists rather in the claim that the account of ontological truth succeeds only insofar as the ultimate relation between truth as disclosedness and propositional truth is understood to be a relation, not of subordination, but of "a tacit but unexplained complementarity" (xviii).