Heidegger’s understanding of the relation between his ontological concept of ‘being-guilty’ and Luther’s theological concept of ‘sin’

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn his 1927 lecture ‘Phenomenology and Theology’, Heidegger claims that philosophy is the formally indicative ontological co-direction [Mitleitung] of basic theological concepts. For this claim, he proposes the example of his ontological concept of guilt (i.e. ‘being-guilty’ [Schuldigsein]) as a formal indication [formale Anzeige] which functions as a co-direction for the theological concept of sin. This paper examines how ‘being-guilty’ and ‘sin’ can be related in this way. First, I introduce Heidegger’s notion of formal indication. Next, I explore the ontological meaning of ‘being-guilty’ in Being and Time. Then, I investigate the theological issue of sin with reference to Heidegger’s reading of Luther. Finally, I argue for the cogency of Heidegger’s claim by demonstrating the way in which ‘being-guilty’ can formally indicate and co-direct the meaning of ‘sin’.